Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Prominent accounts of collective intentional activity explain the nature of social groups by virtue of a specific criterion: goal-directedness. In doing so, these accounts offer little in the way of determining whether there are any differences among social groups. In this paper, I propose a refined framework of collective intentional activity that can distinguish among social groups better than alternative accounts, and which has revisionary but nevertheless plausible implications for the nature of the family: specifically, that certain friendship relationships may (...) count as genuinely familial, and that we ought to count them as such. I argue that social groups are distinguished by what we can expect from one another within different kinds of social groups; specifically, that there is an important difference between reciprocity that is equivalent in performance and reciprocity that is equivalent in intention; familial groups are specifically guided by this latter kind of reciprocity. This more inclusive definition of familial groups may have important implications for how such groups are supported within a given society – for instance, by recognizing certain caring relations as essential for well-being and supporting them accordingly. (shrink)

Perhaps the best way to understand the novelty of Berofsky’s approach is to discuss two prevailing views about autonomy he rejects. On one of these views, we have the following picture: Autonomous agents develop powers to critically reflect upon and evaluate their past and present motivations. Such reflection inevitably leads to conflicts between reflective evaluation and existing motivation. The workaholic judges that he should spend more time with his family; the smoker does not want to have the craving for cigarettes (...) she does have. When such conflicts arise, one exercises autonomy by choosing in favor of the evaluations or higher-order desires over one’s first-order desires. Reason wins out over desire, or the higher self—the “true” or “real” self—wins out over the lower self. (shrink)

In their article “Ethical Responsibilities for Companies that Process Personal Data”, McCoy and colleagues (2023) propose the Ethical Data Practices Framework as a tool for navigating and preventin...

Drawing on qualitative interviews with parents of preschool children, the author addresses parental responses to children’s gender nonconformity. The author’s analyses indicate that parents welcome what they perceive as gender nonconformity among their young daughters, while their responses in relation to sons are more complex. Many parents across racial and class backgrounds accept or encourage some tendencies they consider atypical for boys. But this acceptance is balanced by efforts to approximate hegemonic ideals of masculinity. The author considers these patterns in (...) the context of gender as an interactional accomplishment, demonstrating that parents are often consciously aware of their own role in accomplishing gender with and for their sons. Heterosexual fathers are especially likely to be motivated in that accomplishment work by their own personal endorsement of hegemonic masculinity, while heterosexual mothers and gay parents are more likely to be motivated by accountability to others in relation to those ideals. (shrink)

This paper argues that two areas vital to the teaching profession's own development and to the development of its standing in society have been neglected in inservice education and training. The first, an understanding and development of the 'public' dimension of teaching, suggests that teachers have duties and concerns which transcend those of professionals in the private sector because the public domain is a necessary focus for the promotion of collective life as opposed to individual interests. The second, an appreciation (...) of the 'ecological' context of teaching, locates its practice within wider political and social issues and deepens the teaching profession's understanding of itself. The evidence of neglect of these areas is derived from questionnaire data drawn by the authors from primary and secondary schools on their inservice priorities. (shrink)

Increasingly, nurses conduct scientific inquiry into complex health‐care problems by collaborating on teams with researchers from other highly specialized fields. As cross‐disciplinary research proliferates and becomes institutionalized globally, researchers will increasingly encounter the need to integrate their particular research perspectives within inquiries without sacrificing the potential contributions of their discipline‐specific expertise. The work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1904–1984) offers the necessary philosophical grounding. Here, I defend a role for philosophy in cross‐disciplinary research and present selected ideas in Lonergan's work. (...) These include: (1) a dynamic, normative pattern that each inquirer operates uniquely also forms the common core, or unity, in knowing; (2) the possibility of cross‐disciplinary knowledge development is dependent on each researcher's consciousness of her or his attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibleness; and (3) shifts in researchers' viewpoints, or horizons, facilitate their collaborative inquiry and their grasp of the unity in knowing. The desire to know, shared by team members, drives their inquiry. Lonergan's stance is consistent with nursing values because it respects, but does not unconditionally privilege, any researcher or discipline. Arguments support a claim that Lonergan's perspective is well suited to guide nurse researchers participating on cross‐disciplinary health research teams. (shrink)

In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking that our (...) practices of holding responsible cannot be entirely insulated from incompatibilist concerns about freedom and determinism. The second purpose is to argue that these incompatibilist concerns are in fact legitimate concerns: There are sound reasons to believe that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible do require at least sometimes in our lives that we must be capable of acting freely in a manner that is not determined. I defend this thesis by spelling out why I believe various compatibilist strategies attempting to show that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism fail to show this. In the course of this critique, a general theme will emerge: In order to do full justice to our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible and the freedoms thus involved, one must distinguish between different types of freedom, and in particular, between freedom of action and freedom of will. (shrink)

For a half - century, I have been developing a view of free will that is incompatible with determinism and, in the process, attempting to answer the Intelligibility Question about such a free will: Can one make sense of an incompatibilist or libertarian free will without reducing it to mere chance, or mystery, and can such a free will be reconciled with modern views of the cosmos and human beings? In this paper, I discuss recent refinements to my earlier writings (...) on such a view, refinements developed in recent years in response to the large critical literature on my views in the past several decades. My view has usually been designated an event-causal view of libertarian free will and distinguished from non-causal and agent-causal libertarian views. But I was never happy with this designation of my view as “event-causal” and did not use it myself in earlier writings. In this paper, I explain why I now reject it altogether. I have come to believe that to avoid numerous misunderstandings in current debates about free will, we must distinguish four different kinds of libertarian theories, not merely three: in addition to non-causal, agent-causal, and event-causal theories, we need to add a fourth kind, which might be called an agent-causal/event-causal theory. My view has always been of this fourth kind. It represents what I call in the title of this paper the “fourth way forward” for making sense of an incompatibilist free will. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes the latest arguments for and against the claim that determinism is incompatible with free will that rely on the first criterion for free will – alternative possibilities, or the “power to do otherwise.” The chapter begins by considering the most discussed argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism based on AP, called the “Consequence Argument” by Peter van Inwagen. Current debates about this Consequence Argument are thoroughly canvassed; and in the process, various views are critically (...) discussed concerning the meaning of power, ability, “can,” “could have done otherwise,” laws of nature, changing the past, and other notions. Compatibilist analyses of these notions are critically examined. (shrink)

This chapter considers the broader philosophical and cultural implications of the ideas and theory of free will presented in this book. Topics discussed include: social and political freedoms, value pluralism, free will and the moral law, utopias and totalitarianism, behavioral engineering and control, the theories of American pragmatism, value empiricism, John Stuart Mill on liberty and happiness, the influence of birth and upbringing on freedom and responsibility, criminal responsibility, modernity and its discontents.

An attempt is made in this chapter and the following two to give an incompatibilist or indeterminist account of free will that is consistent with current scientific knowledge without assuming any obscure or mysterious notions of agency or causation. A number of topics are discussed in the process of constructing this theory: self‐forming actions or willings, moral and prudential choice, divided will, indeterminate efforts, chaos theory, non‐equilibrium thermodynamics, quantum physics, neural networks, weakness of will, mind and body, plural voluntary control, (...) choosing for reasons, consciousness and purpose, self‐networks, chance, folk psychology and the brain, value experiments, and others. (shrink)

Libertarian or incompatibilist conceptions of free will (according to which free will is incompatible with determinism) have been under withering attack in the modern era of Western philosophy as obscure and unintelligible and have been dismissed as outdated by many twentieth century philosophers and scientists because of their supposed lack of fit with modern images of human beings in the natural and human sciences. In a recent book (The Significance of Free Will), I attempt to reconcile incompatibilist free will with (...) new images of human beings emerging in the physical, biological, behavioral, cognitive, and neuro-sciences—avoiding the usual libertarian appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation. In this paper, I extend that effort with special attention to the relation of libertarian free will to recent research on neural networks and cognition and to recent philosophical debates about freedom, control, rationality and responsibility. (shrink)

Libertarian or incompatibilist conceptions of free will (according to which free will is incompatible with determinism) have been under withering attack in the modern era of Western philosophy as obscure and unintelligible and have been dismissed as outdated by many twentieth century philosophers and scientists because of their supposed lack of fit with modern images of human beings in the natural and human sciences. In a recent book (The Significance of Free Will), I attempt to reconcile incompatibilist free will with (...) new images of human beings emerging in the physical, biological, behavioral, cognitive, and neuro-sciences—avoiding the usual libertarian appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation. In this paper, I extend that effort with special attention to the relation of libertarian free will to recent research on neural networks and cognition and to recent philosophical debates about freedom, control, rationality and responsibility. (shrink)

The indeterminist theory of free will presented in Chs. 8 and 9 is further developed in this chapter by responding to a series of objections. The issues raised by these objections involve indeterminacy and possible worlds, explanation and probability, non‐deterministic causation, rational explanation of actions, character building and the historical dimension of responsibility, strength and weakness of will, choice, responsibility and indeterminism, action and indeterminism, control and responsibility, agent causation, and self‐determination.

Regarding Rachlin's behavioral act/pattern theory of self-control, it is argued that some cases of self-control involve pattern/ pattern conflicts rather than merely act/pattern conflicts and that some patterns must be viewed as internal representational states of mind (plans) rather than merely as patterns of actual overt behavior.

Robert Kane provides a critical overview of debates about free will of the past half century, relating this recent inquiry to the broader history of the free will issue and to vital currents of twentieth century thought. Kane also defends a traditional libertarian or incompatibilist view of free will, employing arguments that are both new to philosophy and that respond to contemporary developments in physics and biology, neuro science, and the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

Perhaps the best way to understand the novelty of Berofsky’s approach is to discuss two prevailing views about autonomy he rejects. On one of these views, we have the following picture: Autonomous agents develop powers to critically reflect upon and evaluate their past and present motivations. Such reflection inevitably leads to conflicts between reflective evaluation and existing motivation. The workaholic judges that he should spend more time with his family; the smoker does not want to have the craving for cigarettes (...) she does have. When such conflicts arise, one exercises autonomy by choosing in favor of the evaluations or higher-order desires over one’s first-order desires. Reason wins out over desire, or the higher self—the “true” or “real” self—wins out over the lower self. (shrink)

As the author repeats, this book is not a history of the concept of analysis but rather an interpretation of the transformation of analysis in the classical sense into analytic in the critical sense. Moreover, the work concentrates not on the concept of analysis itself but rather on the discourse about analysis prevailing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With this focus, the author devotes the greater part of this book to his discussion of what a dozen or so thinkers (...) spanning this period have written about analysis, an important concept with widely divergent meanings. The sorting-out of what analysis means in each thinker of this period seems to be a secondary concern of the author. His primary goal is to advance his interpretation that analysis, a wonderfully inventive power in the hands of seventeenth-century thinkers, suffers a "progressive weakening" in the hands of thinkers of the century following. In this sense, the work is more philosophical than historical. (shrink)